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Abstract—Blockchain, an emerging decentralized security sys-
tem, has been applied in many applications, such as bitcoin,
smart grid, and Internet-of-Things. However, running the mining
process may cost too much energy consumption and computing
resource usage on handheld devices, which restricts the use of
blockchain in mobile environments. In this paper, we consider de-
ploying edge computing service to support the mobile blockchain.
We propose an auction-based edge computing resource market of
the edge computing service provider. Since there is competition
among miners, the allocative externalities (positive and negative)
are taken into account in the model. In our auction mecha-
nism, we maximize the social welfare while guaranteeing the
truthfulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency.
Based on blockchain mining experiment results, we define a hash
power function that characterizes the probability of successfully
mining a block. Through extensive simulations, we evaluate the
performance of our auction mechanism which shows that our
edge computing resources market model can efficiently solve
the social welfare maximization problem for the edge computing
service provider.
Index Terms—mobile blockchain, auction, edge computing,
pricing, resources allocation, proof of work
I. INTRODUCTION
Decentralized cryptocurrencies have witnessed explosive
growth since the first decentralized distributed currency Bit-
coin was launched in 2009 [1]. In contrast to traditional
currencies, decentralized cryptocurrencies are traded among
participants over a peer-to-peer (P2P) network without relying
on trusted third parties like banks or financial regulatory
authorities. As the backbone technology, blockchain protocol
provides an effective consensus mechanism to successfully
solve problems about incentive, tamper-resistance, trust and so
on [2]. Recently, blockchain has heralded many applications
in various fields, such as finance [3], Internet of Things [4],
smart grid [5] and cognitive radio [6]. According to the
market research firm Tractica, it is estimated that the annual
revenue for enterprise applications of blockchain will increase
to $19.9 billion by 2025 [7]. It is also worth noting that the
access scope of the blockchain can be not only public as
Bitcoin, but also private or consortium/community [8] where
blockchain networks are established and usually managed by
the blockchain owner1.
1A good example is R3 consortium (https://www.r3.com/) experimenting
an Ethereum private blockchain on Microsoft Azure Blockchain Service.
The security and reliability of blockchains depend on a
distributed consensus mechanism. Specifically, a group of
participants in the blockchain network, called miners, try to
solve a computationally difficult problem, i.e., the proof of
work (PoW) puzzle, where the process is called mining. First,
each miner receives and selects certain number of transaction
records from public. Once solving the puzzle, the miner will
broadcast a block which combines the transaction records and
relevant information in the blockchain network. Next, this
block will be verified by the majority of other miners for
consensus and then finally be added to the blockchain. The
miner which successfully finishes the above steps will receive
a fixed reward and certain transaction fees as incentives of
mining.
However, blockchain applications in mobile environments
are still seldom realized because solving the PoW puzzle
needs high computing power and large amount of energy
which mobile devices cannot satisfy. In this paper, we consider
the edge computing services for mobile users to deploy their
mining tasks and thus support the mobile blockchain applica-
tions. Specifically, we discuss the allocation and pricing issue
for edge computing resource. We first propose an auction-
based market model. The market consists of three entities,
i.e., blockchain owner, edge computing service provider (ESP)
and miners. Considering the competition among miners [2] and
network effects of blockchain by nature [9], we then study the
auction mechanism with allocative externalities to maximize
the social welfare. Our social maximization mechanism is
truthful (incentive compatible), individually rational and com-
putationally efficient. Based on our real-world experiment of
mobile blockchain, we analyze the probability of successfully
mining a block and verify the probability function. Our sim-
ulation results show that the proposed auction market model
can not only help the ESP to make practical sale strategies,
but also incentivize the blockchain owner in adjusting the
blockchain protocol. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work that investigates resource management and pricing
in the mobile blockchain with an auction model.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II
reviews related work, and the system model of edge comput-
ing resource market for mobile blockchain is introduced in
Section III. Section IV formulates the social maximization
problem and gives theoretical analysis. Section V presents
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experimental results of mobile blockchain and performance
analysis. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Over the recent years, there are some studies on the eco-
nomics and mining strategies in the blockchain network. As
one of the pioneer papers, the authors in [10] modeled the
mining process as a game played by miners. Each miner’s
strategy is to choose which branch of blockchain to mine
on. They proved the existence of a Nash equilibrium when
all miners behave as expected by Bitcoin designer. Further,
they explored the case that some miners may deviate from the
expected behavior, which makes blockchain network unstable
and vulnerable. The authors in [11] proposed a game model in
which the occurrence of solving the PoW puzzle is modeled
as a Poisson process. Miners have to decide the size of block
to broadcast as their response. Analytical solutions to the
Nash equilibrium in a two-miner case was given. In [12], the
authors designed a cooperative game model to investigate the
mining pool. In the pool, miners form a coalition to accumulate
their computational power and have steady reward. However,
these works only studied the internal mining scheme and paid
little attention to the actual running of blockchain in more
dynamic environments, i.e., mobile blockchain. Therefore, this
motivates us to place the edge computing service as underlying
technology for mobile blockchain network and build an edge
computing resource market model. The blockchain technology
can achieve more extensive and promising applications in
the mobile information society. The auction design has been
widely studied in other resource allocation problems, such
as spectrum trading [13], [14] and data crowdsensing [15].
However, none of these works can be directly applied to edge
computing applications for mobile blockchain, since they only
focused on the specific properties constrained by the studied
topics. For example, in the blockchain networks, the allocative
externalities [16], [17] should be considered because of miners
care about the computational power allocated to the others.
The authors in [18] used deep learning to recover the classical
optimal auction for revenue maximization and applied it in
the edge computing resources allocation. However, it is less
about the design of auction and cannot guarantee the incentive
compatibility.
III. SYSTEM MODEL: MOBILE BLOCKCHAIN AND
MARKET MODEL
Figure 1 shows the auction-based market model for trading
edge computing resources. The blockchain owner launches a
blockchain application and designs the protocol for blockchain
network operation. The mobile users buy resources from the
edge computing service provider (ESP) and become miners.
In the miners network, they take part in the mining process to
contribute new blocks to the blockchain.
A. Mobile Blockchain
Blockchain can be used to develop applications with mobile
devices, as indicated in our earlier study [19]. To support the
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Fig. 1. Edge computing resource market for mobile blockchain.
blockchain based service, there are a set of miners continu-
ously running a consensus protocol [1] to confirm and secure
distributed data or transactions at backend. According to the
protocol, miners are required to finish the mining task, i.e.,
solving the PoW puzzle. The mining process is conducted
in a tournament structure, and miners chase each other to
obtain the solution. Specifically, the PoW algorithm involves
finding a nonce value that, together with additional fields about
all valid and received transactions, the previous block and
the timestamp, the output satisfies a given condition. If the
nonce is found, the miner will combine it and additional fields
into a block and then broadcast the block to peers in the
blockchain network for verification and reaching consensus.
Finally, the new block can be linked to the existing accepted
chain of blocks. However, for a mobile user, it is unrealistic
to continuously run such a computationally difficult program
which requires high computing power and consumes a large
volume of energy and time. Because the outstanding charac-
teristics of edge computing: low latency, mobility and wide-
spread geographical distribution [20], we consider offloading
the mining tasks to the edge servers.
B. Edge Computing Resources Trading
As shown in Fig. 1, we consider a scenario where there is
one ESP, one blockchain owner and a community of mobile
users N ={1, . . . , N}. Each mobile user wants to be a miner
which runs a mobile blockchain application to record and
verify the transactions or data sent to the community. Due to
the computing limitation on their devices, mobile users want to
offload the task of solving PoW to the nearby edge computing
servers deployed by the ESP. In particular, the ESP launches
an auction to sell its services. It first announces its service and
relevant information to mobile users. Then, the mobile users
submit their resource demand profile d = (d1, . . . , dN ) and
corresponding bids b = (b1, . . . , bN ) which represents their
valuations of the offered services. After receiving the demands
and bids, the ESP selects the winners as the successful miners
and notifies the mobile users the allocation x = (x1, . . . , xN )
and the service price p = (p1, . . . , pN ). The setting xi = 1
means user i is within the winner list and being allocated
resources that it demands for while xi = 0 is for no resource2.
pi is the sale price that user i is charged by the ESP3. At the
end of the auction, the winners make the payment and access
the edge computing service.
C. Blockchain Mining with Edge Computing Service
With the allocation xi and demand di, miner i’s hash
power γi relative to other miners’ allocated resources can be
calculated by:
γi(d,x) =
dαi xi∑
j∈N d
α
j xj
(1)
which is a fraction function that
∑
i∈N γi = 1. α is the
curve fitting parameter of the hash power function γi(d,x)
verified by our real-world experiment, the detail of which will
be presented in Section V.
In the mining tournament, miners compete to be the first to
solve PoW with correct nonce value and propagate the block
to reach consensus. The generation of new blocks follows a
Poisson process with a constant rate 1λ throughout the whole
blockchain network [21]. Before the tournament, miners col-
lect unconfirmed transactions into their blocks. We represent
the size of transactions of each miner by s = (s1, . . . , sN ).
When miner i propagates its block to the mobile blockchain
network for consensus, the time for verifying each transaction
is affected by the size of transactions si. The first miner which
successfully has its block achieve consensus can get a reward
R. The reward is composed of a fixed bonus T for mining a
new block and a flexible transaction fee t determined by the
size of its collected transactions s and the transaction fee rate
r [11]. Thus, miner i’s expected reward Ri can be expressed
by:
Ri = (T + rsi)Pi(γi(d,x), si), (2)
where Pi(γi(d,x), si) is the probability that miner i receives
the reward by contributing a block to the blockchain.
From the mining tournament above, winning the reward
depends on the successful mining and instant propagation.
The probability of mining a new block Pmi is equal to miner
i’s hash power γi, i.e., Pmi = γi. However, the miner may
even lose the tournament if its new block does not achieve
consensus as the first. This kind of mined block that cannot
be added on to the blockchain is called orphaned block [11].
Moreover, the block containing larger size of transactions has
higher chance becoming orphaned. This is because a larger
block needs more propagation time, thus causing higher delay
for consensus. Here, we assume miner i’s block propagation
time τi is linear to the size of transactions in its block, i.e.,
τi = ξsi. ξ is a constant that reflects the impact of si on τi.
2The user becomes a miners if it wins the auction.
3The payment for user which is not allocated any resource is zero, i.e.,
p = 0.
Since the arrival of new blocks follows a Poisson distribu-
tion, miner i’s orphaning probability can be approximated as
follows [22]:
P oi = 1− exp(−
1
λ
τi). (3)
After substituting τi, we can express Pi as follows:
Pi = Pmi (1− P oi ) (4)
= γie
− 1λ ξsi .
D. Blockchain Management
The blockchain owner maintains the blockchain mining
protocol that specifies the fixed bonus T for the contributing
miner and the transaction fee rate r. Through adjusting the dif-
ficulty of finding a new block, the blockchain owner keeps the
average time λ at a reasonable constant value4. Additionally,
a blockchain in PoW systems is only as secure as the amount
of computing power dedicated to mining it [9]. This results
in positive network effects: as more mobile users participate
in mining and more computing resources are invested, the
value of reward given to miners increases since the blockchain
network is more stable and secure. Empirically, we define the
network effects by a common S-shaped utility function [23]:
w(dN ) =
1− e−νdN
1 + µe−νdN
, (5)
where dN =
∑
i∈N dixi is the total quantity of allocated
resources and µ, ν are positive parameters. The monotonic
increase of network effect function begins slowly from 0,
then accelerates (convexly), and then eventually slows down
(concavely) and converges asymptotically to 1.
IV. SOCIAL WELFARE MAXIMIZATION AUCTION FOR
EDGE COMPUTING SERVICE
In this section, we propose an auction mechanism for the
ESP to allocate edge computing resources efficiently. We focus
on maximizing the social welfare while guaranteeing the truth-
fulness, individual rationality and computational efficiency.
A. Valuation of mobile users
To take part in the auction, a mobile user needs to give the
bid representing its valuation to the auctioneer, i.e., the ESP.
Since the mobile user i cannot know the number of winners
and total supply of computing resources until auction ends, it
can only give the bid bi according to its expected reward Ri
which is also called ex-ante valuation v
′
i, i.e.,
v
′
i = Ri (6)
4It is worth noting that the blockchain owner is not a central entity that
controls the data storage and mining strategies of the miners. Similar to
the bitcoin protocol [1], the blockchain owner in this paper only designs
the protocol specifies the value of T , r and λ, and does not affect the
decentralization and security of blockchain.
After the auction result is released, user i has an ex-
post valuation v
′′
i of the edge computing service considering
network effects, which is defined by
v
′′
i = Riw (7)
where w is the network effect defined in (5).
After substituting (1), (4), (5) into (6) and (7), we have the
specific expression of user i’s ex-ante and ex-post valuation:
v
′
i = (T + rsi)e
− 1λ ξsi , (8)
v
′′
i =
dαi xi∑
j∈N d
α
j xj
1− e−ν
∑
i∈N dixi
1 + µe−ν
∑
i∈N dixi
(T + rsi)e
− 1λ ξsi . (9)
B. Auction Maximizing Social Welfare
Once receiving bids b from all the mobile users, ESP
will select winners and determine corresponding payments
to maximize the social welfare. Let c denote the unit cost
of running the edge computing service. ESP’s total cost is
C(dN ) = cdN . Thus, designing such an auction becomes
solving an optimization problem:
max
x
∑
i∈N
dαi xi∑
j∈N d
α
j xj
1− e−ν
∑
i∈N dixi
1 + µe−ν
∑
i∈N dixi
(T + rsi)e
− 1λ ξsi
−
∑
i∈N
cdixi (10)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
dixi ≤ D (11)
xi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ N (12)
where the objective function in (10) is the difference between
the sum of all users’ ex-post valuations and ESP’s total
cost. The constraint in (11) defines the maximum quantity of
computing resources that ESP can offer denoted by D.
Based on the above system model, we first consider a
simpler case where all mobile users submit various bids to
compete for a fixed quantity of resources. Without loss of
generality, we set di = 1,∀i ∈ N . Then, the optimization
problem can be expressed as follows:
max
x
∑
i∈N
xi∑
j∈N xj
1− e−ν
∑
i∈N xi
1 + µe−ν
∑
i∈N xi
(T + rsi)e
− 1λ ξsi
−
∑
i∈N
cxi (13)
s.t.
∑
i∈N
xi ≤ D (14)
xi ∈ {0, 1},∀i ∈ N (15)
We aim to solve this integer programming efficiently while
making the auction process truthful and individually rational.
The proposed auction is based on the Myerson’s well-known
characterization [24] as described in Theorem 1.
Theorem 1. ([25, Theorem 13.6]) An auction is truthful if
and only if it satisfies the following two properties:
1) Monotonicity of winner selection rule: If user i wins the
auction with bid bi, then it will also win with any higher
bid b′i > bi.
2) Critical payment: The payment by a winner is the
smallest value needed in order to win the auction.
By using Theorem 1, our auction mechanism is illustrated in
Algorithm 1. In Lines 5-12, the winner selection process is
conducted with a greedy scheme. We define a winner set W .
Including a user i in the set is equivalent to assigning xi = 1.
Thus, we rewrite the problem in an alternative form as follows:
max
W⊆N
S(W)
s.t.S(W) =
∑
i∈W
1
|W|
1− e−ν|W|
1 + µe−ν|W|
bi − c |W| ,
|W| ≤ D
where |W| measures the number of winners in W , S(W)
is social welfare of W and bi = v′i = (T + rsi)e−λksi
because the auction is truthful. In the winner selection process
(Lines 6-12), mobile users are first sorted in a descending order
according to their bids. We then add one user sequentially
to the winner set W , which will be stopped before the
corresponding social welfare S(W) decreases. Finally, the
solution W is output by the algorithm.
Proposition 2. The resource allocation x output by Algo-
rithm 1 is globally optimal to the social welfare maximization
problem given in (13)-(15).
Proof: With proof by contradiction, this result follows
from Claim 3.
Claim 3. Let WA be the solution output by Algorithm 1 on
input b, and WO the optimal solution. If WA 6= WO, then
we can construct another solution W∗O the social welfare of
which S(W∗O) is even larger than WO.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we assume b1 ≥ · · · ≥
bN and WA 6= WO. Let m be the first element (while-
loop Lines 6-12) where m /∈ WO. Since (bm is minimal by
assumption.) m is maximal, we must have 1, . . . ,m−1 ∈ WO
and in particular, the set of corresponding bid bWO has
the form bWO = {b1, b2, . . . , bm−1, b′m, b′m+1, . . . , b′|WO|},
where the bids b1, . . . , b′|WO| are listed in the descend-
ing order. Meanwhile, Algorithm 1 chooses bWA =
{b1, b2, . . . , bm−1, bm, bm+1, . . . , b|WO|} and there must be
bm > b
′
j for all j ≥ m. In particular, we have bm > b′m.
Hence, we define bW∗O = bWO ∪{bm}\{b′m} , i.e., we obtain
bW∗O by deleting the mth bid in bWO and adding bm. Now
we have the social welfare of bW∗O :
S(W∗O) = S(WO) +
1
|WO|
1− e−ν|WO|
1 + µe−ν|WO|
(bm − b′m).
Since bm − b′m > 0 and |W∗O| = |WO|, S(W∗O) is strictly
larger than S(WO), which is in contradiction to that WO is
the optimal solution. This proves the claim.
In Lines 13-24, for each iteration, we exclude one winner
from the user set and rerun the winner selection process to
calculate the payment for the winner. The payment calculation
is based on the well-known Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG)
mechanism [26].
Algorithm 1 Social Welfare Maximization Auction
Input: Mobile users’ bid profile b = (b1, . . . , bN ).
Output: Resource allocation profile x = (x1, . . . , xN ) and
payment profile p = (p1, . . . , pN ).
1: begin
2: for each i ∈ N do
3: xi ← 0, pi ← 0
4: end for
5: W ← ∅,Wt ← ∅, S ← 0, St ← 0
. W is the set of winners.
6: while S ≤ S′,W 6= N , |W| ≤ D do
7: j ← argmaxj∈N\Wbj
8: W ←Wt
9: Wt ←W ∪ {j}, S ← St
10: St ← 1|Wt| 1−e
−ν|Wt|
1+µe−ν|Wt|
∑
l∈Wt bl − c |Wt|
11: end while
12: for each j ∈ W do
13: xj ← 1
14: N−j ← N \ {j},W−j ←W \ {j}
15: W ′ ← ∅,W ′t ← ∅, S′ ← 0, S′t ← 0
16: while S′ ≤ S′t,W ′ 6= N−j do
17: k ← argmaxk∈N−j\W′bk
18: W ′ ←W ′t
19: W ′t ←W ′ ∪ {k}, S′ ← S′t
20: S′t ← 1|W′t|
1−e−ν|W′t|
1+µe−ν|W′t|
∑
l∈W′t bl − c |W ′t|
21: end while
22: pj = S
′− 1|W−j | 1−e
−ν|W−j |
1+µe−ν|W−j |
∑
l∈W−j bl+c |W−j |
23: end for
24: end
Proposition 4. The Social Welfare Maximization Auction
(Algorithm 1) is truthful.
Proof: Since the calculation of payment by the algorithm
relies on VCG mechanism, it directly satisfies the second
condition in Theorem 1. For the first condition about mono-
tonicity, we only need to show that if a winner i raises its
bid from bi to b+i where b
+
i > bi, it still stays in the set
of winners. We denote the original set of winners as W
and the new set of winners W+ after winner i changes its
bid to b+i . The original bid set is b = {b1, . . . , bi, . . . bN}
(i ≤ |W|) sorted in the descending order. In addition, we
define S(bU ) = S(U),∀U ⊆ N which means the social
welfare of a set of bids is equal to the set of its corresponding
users. We discuss the monotonicity in two cases:
1) Case 1: bi−1 ≥ b+i ≥ bi ≥ bi+1. The new set of ordered
bids is b+ = {b1, . . . , bi−1, b+i , bi+1, . . . bN}. We have
S({b1, . . . , b+i }) =
1− e−νi
(1 + µe−νi)i
i−1∑
j=1
bj + b
+
i
− ci
>S({b1, . . . , bi}) =
i∑
j=1
1− e−νi
(1 + µe−νi) i
bj − ci.
(17)
The social welfare of new set of bids {b1, . . . , b+i } is larger
than that of original set of bids {b1, . . . , bi}, which guarantees
b+i being in the set of winning bids.
2) Case 2: bk−1 ≥ b+i ≥ bk ≥ . . . ≥ bi,
1 < k < i. The new set of ordered bids is b+ =
{b1, . . . , bk−1, b+i , bk, . . . , bi+1, . . . bN}. We have
S({b1, . . . , bk−1, b+i }) =
1− e−νk
(1 + µe−νk)k
k−1∑
j=1
bj + b
+
i
−ck,
(18)
S({b1, . . . bk−1, bk}) = 1− e
−νk
(1 + µe−νk)k
k∑
j=1
bj − ck, (19)
S({b1, . . . , bk−1}) = 1− e
−ν(k−1)
(1 + µe−ν(k−1))(k − 1)
k−1∑
j=1
bj−c(k−1).
(20)
Since in the original set of bids b, {b1,...,bk−1, bk, . . . , bi}
are all selected as winning bids, S({b1, . . . bk−1, bk}) >
S({b1, . . . , bk−1}). Because the inequality in (16), we have
S({b1, . . . , bk−1, b+i }) > S({b1, . . . , bk−1}),
which implies that b+i still wins the auction. This concludes the
proof.
Proposition 5. The Social Welfare Maximization Auction
(Algorithm 1) is computationally efficient and individually
rational.
Proof: Since the time complexity of finding the maximum
miner’s bid is O(N) and the number of winners is at most N ,
the time complexity of the winner selection process (while-
loop, Lines 6-12) is O(N2). In each iteration of payment
calculation process (Lines 13-24), a similar winner selection
process is executed. Therefore, the whole auction process can
be performed in polynomial time with the time complexity of
O(N3) which is efficient. According to Proposition 2 and the
properties of the VCG mechanism [26], the payment scheme
in Algorithm 1 guarantees the individual rationality.
V. EXPERIMENT RESULTS AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
In this section, we provide simulation results of the proposed
auction, from which we can further obtain useful decision
making strategies for ESP and the blockchain owner.
S({b1, . . . bk−1, bk}) = 1− e
−νk
(1 + µe−νk)k
k−1∑
j=1
bj + bk
 < 1− e−νk
(1 + µe−νk)k
k−1∑
j=1
bj + b
+
i
 = S ({b1, . . . , bk−1, b+i }) (16)
A. Verification for Hash Power Function
An earlier real-world mobile blockchain mining experiment
has been done in [19], [27]. In the experiment, we designed a
mobile blockchain client application in the Android platform
and implemented it on three mobile devices (miners). Each
of the three client applications generates transactions and then
starts mining with one CPU core. The miners’ CPU utilization
rate is managed and measured on the Docker platform [28].
Each mobile device mines the block under Go-Ethereum [29]
blockchain framework. To verify the hash power function (1),
we vary one miner’s service demand while fixing the other
two miners’ service demand (CPU utilization) at 40 and 60.
Besides, we set the number of transactions in each mined block
to be 10 for all miners. Figure 2 shows the change of the
hash power, i.e., the probability of successfully mining a block
with different amount of computing resources. We note that
the hash power function defined in (1) can well fit the actual
experimental data. From these results, we choose the hash
power function with parameter α = 1.2 in the rest of this
section.
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Fig. 2. Estimation of the hash power function γ(d).
B. Simulation Results
We vary the number of mobiles users N from 100 to 1000,
the mining bonus T from 0 to 5, and the transaction fee rate
r from 0.001 to 0.009. We set µ = 0.5, ν = 0.005, ξ = 1 and
c = 0.02. The transaction size s of each user is uniformly
distributed over [0, 1000]. Since the blockchain owner can
adjust the average time of mining a block, we also varied
the average time of mining a block λ from 100 to 1800 with
increment of 212.5. Each measurement is averaged over 100
instances.
1) Impact of the number of mobile users N : Figure 3 shows
the impact of the total number of mobile users N on
the social welfare S and the number of participating
users |W|. We fix T = 2.5, r = 0.007 and λ = 600.
We observe that |W| and S increase at diminishing rate
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Fig. 3. Impact of the number of mobile users on social welfare S and number
of winners |W|.
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Fig. 4. Impact of fixed bonus T .
as the base of mobile users becomes larger. Naturally,
the ESP can select more winners as miners to increase
the social welfare with more mobiles users. However, at
the same time, the negative effects from the competition
among a larger number of miners are apparent, which
slows down the rise of the social welfare as well as the
number of winners.
2) Impact of the fixed bonus T for mining a block and the
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Fig. 5. Impact of the transaction fee rate r.
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Fig. 6. Impact of the parameter λ.
transaction fee rate r: We set N = 600 and λ = 600. By
fixing r = 0.007 and T = 2.5, we consider the impact of
varied fixed bonus and transaction fee rate on the social
welfare and the number of selected miners. From Figs. 4
and 5, we note that as if the blockchain owner raises the
bonus or the transaction fee rate, more social welfare
will be generated in nearly proportion. However, the
number of winners increases and tends to be stable. This
is because there will be fierce competition if too many
miners participate in the blockchain network, which
causes the loss of social welfare.
3) Impact of the average time λ for successfully mining a
block: In Fig. 6, we fix N = 600, T = 2.5 and r =
0.007. When the blockchain owner raises the difficulty
of mining a block, represented by λ, the social welfare
increases while the number of winners initially increases
and then declines. Note that the user’s expected reward
R, i.e., the valuation for edge computing service, grows
with increasing λ. When the difficulty λ is small and
each user’s valuation is also small, the ESP has to accept
more users, i.e., more winners, to maximize the social
welfare. However, if the difficulty of mining a block
becomes high and each user values the service more,
the ESP can reduce the number of winning users while
achieving the optimal social welfare. Another reason for
the decreasing number of winners is the increasingly
intense competition among them.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have investigated the edge computing
services that enable mobile blockchain. To efficiently allocate
computing resources, we have proposed an auction-based
market model to maximize the social welfare. In the auction
design, we have considered allocative externalities, including
the competition among the miners as well as the network
effects in the blockchain network. By theoretical analysis and
simulation, we have proved that the auction mechanism is
truthful, individually rational and computationally efficient and
solves the social welfare maximization problem. For the future
work, we will consider variable demands and corresponding
bids of mobile users.
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